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Article detail · 2024 · article

Pair‐efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

ISSN1933-6837
YÖKSİS OpenAlex Open access · diamond Top 10%
Year2024
Citations26OpenAlex
Percentile%94.8
FWCI4.431.00 = world average
Scopus (SJR)Q1
WoS (JCR)Q3

Data source split

  • YÖKSİSYÖKSİS article record
  • YÖKSİS venueTheoretical Economics
  • Catalog match (ISSN)Theoretical Economics
  • OpenAlexOpenAlex enrichment (abstract, citations, topics)

Abstract

OpenAlex English

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto‐efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy‐proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair‐efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair‐efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy‐proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.

Topics

Citations

OpenAlex cited_by_count. Not a WoS or Scopus citation count; those sources have no separate column here.

26citationsOpenAlex · cited_by_count (cache / database)

1 publications in the local catalog that cite this work (OpenAlex reference match; not the full global list).

  1. 2024 Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proofCitations 10 · OpenAlex

Authors

1
  1. ÖZGÜN EKİCİ ÖZYEĞİN ÜNİVERSİTESİ 1