Article detail · 2003
A Structural Model of Government Formation
Journal
Econometrica- Year
- 2003
- Type
- article
Data source split
- YÖKSİS venue Econometrica
- OpenAlex OpenAlex enrichment (abstract, citations, topics)
Abstract
OpenAlex · English
In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.
Topics
Citations
OpenAlex cited_by_count. Not a WoS or Scopus citation count; those sources have no separate column here.
173 citations
OpenAlex cited_by_count (cache / database)
12 publications in the local catalog that cite this work (OpenAlex reference match; not the full global list).
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining 2013
- Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining 2019
- CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS: ESTIMATES FROM A BARGAINING MODEL* 2008
- Bicameralism and Government Formation 2004
- Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining 2011
- Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates from a Bargaining Model 2003
- The Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Under Chapter 13 2007
- Profiling in Bargaining over College Tuition 2006
- AN ANATOMY OF U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 13 2017
- The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies 2004