Devlet Başkanlarının Görev Süresi Sınırlamalarını Dolanma Yöntemleri-Karşılaştırmalı Anayasa Hukuku Perspektifinden Bir Analiz

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Presidential term limits constitute one of the fundamental constitutional mechanisms that prevent the personalization of political power, ensure the periodic transfer of executive authority, and safeguard the continuity of democratic constitutional order. In recent years, however, an increasing number of incumbent presidents have sought to circumvent constitutional term limits through various legal and political mechanisms. This development raises an important constitutional question as to whether the mere existence of term-limit provisions is sufficient to guarantee democratic alternation in power. This dissertation examines presidential term limits from the perspective of comparative constitutional law. It aims to identify the principal constitutional models governing presidential tenure and to systematically analyze the legal and political strategies employed to circumvent constitutional term limits. The research adopts a comparative constitutional methodology based on constitutional texts, constitutional court decisions, international legal instruments, Venice Commission reports, and contemporary scholarly literature. The findings demonstrate that constitutional regulations on presidential term limits can be classified into five principal models. At the same time, presidential term limits may be circumvented through various mechanisms, including constitutional amendments, the adoption of new constitutions, referendums, judicial reinterpretation, the “blank slate” doctrine, the loyal successor strategy, and the postponement of elections. The study further reveals that the effectiveness of constitutional term limits depends not merely on their textual existence but also on institutional and political factors, including judicial independence, separation of powers, political pluralism, democratic political culture, and constitutional fidelity. The dissertation concludes that constitutional term limits remain indispensable safeguards of democratic constitutionalism but are insufficient in isolation. Its principal contribution lies in developing a systematic conceptual framework that classifies constitutional circumvention strategies and evaluates their implications for constitutional democracy from a comparative constitutional law perspective.